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HATE SPEECH, PUBLIC ASSURANCE, AND 
THE CIVIC STANDING OF SPEAKERS  
AND VICTIMS 
Vincent Blasi* 
Jeremy Waldron and James Weinstein have opened up a 
promising line of inquiry regarding the legitimacy and propriety 
of hate speech regulation. In doing so, they have succeeded in 
reinvigorating a subject that had grown academically formulaic 
even while becoming alarmingly more salient politically and 
culturally. Together they have enriched our understanding with 
their specificity of argumentation, intellectual courage, fair-
minded attentiveness to critics and counter-arguments, 
comparative law perspective, and genuine originality of 
conception. I find that each has shown me at least one significant 
problem in the other’s analysis, a symmetry that I consider a 
tribute to both. 
 I. 
I think that Waldron fails to grapple as fully as he needs to 
with the challenges to his argument posed by the European and 
Canadian cases discussed in Part Four of Weinstein’s article.1 
Those are cases that involve relatively temperate instances of 
speech the substantive message of which challenges the civic 
standing of vulnerable minority groups. Waldron’s intriguing 
claim that such minorities in a political community are entitled to 
the public good of assurance of their civic dignity has much to be 
said for it. However, it seems to me that this newly conceived 
public good is especially implicated when the view that certain 
vulnerable minorities are unworthy of civic status is publicly 
articulated in a temperate manner, precisely because that manner 
 
 * Vincent Blasi is Corliss Lamont Professor of Civil Liberties at Columbia Law 
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 1. James Weinstein, Hate Speech Bans, Democracy, and Political Legitimacy, 32 
CONST. COMMENT. 527, 552–561 (2017). 
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of articulation makes the view less easily marginalized. Waldron 
concedes that extreme outliers do not undercut the requisite 
public assurance. The danger lies in introducing categorical civic 
denigration into the way the polity looks, sounds, and feels. That 
alteration of civic “aesthetics,” as Waldron puts it, is most likely 
to occur when noxious heretical ideas present as respectable, or 
at least eligible for respectful consideration. Hence the insidious 
danger of temperate articulation. Relatedly, Waldron’s assertion, 
which plays a key role in his overall argument, that Western 
democracies have “settled” the question of how race and certain 
other traits central to identity bear on civic status is problematized 
more when heretical views relating to demography and political 
membership are put forward in the form of propositions rather 
than epithets. Waldron admirably avoids the mistake of conflating 
the multifarious instances of hate speech into one 
undifferentiated lump, but I believe that the subset of public 
utterance consisting of the temperate expression of civically 
noxious ideas poses more of a challenge to his position than he 
recognizes. 
Waldron properly observes that “our debate is about hate 
speech restrictions as such, not about the least well-formulated of 
them.” He urges opponents of hate speech regulation such as 
Weinstein “to consider the best case that can be made for 
regulation of this sort and the best drafting that has emerged from 
fifty years or more of legislative experience in most advanced 
democracies before attempting to show that nevertheless such 
regulations are wrong in principle.”2 He notes approvingly that 
Section 18(1) of the UK’s Public Order Act outlaws only an 
especially aggressive subset of hate speech. To justify prosecution 
under that provision, the offender must employ words or gestures 
of a certain character: “threatening, abusive or insulting.” 
Moreover, either the speaker must intend by his utterance to stir 
up racial hatred, or such hatred must be likely to be stirred up 
“having regard to all the circumstances.” Waldron contrasts this 
“hate speech provision,” the type of law he aims to justify, with 
less circumscribed “public order provisions,” such as Section 5 of 
the same Public Order Act, that extend their prohibitions beyond 
speakers who are bent on stirring up hatred directly by means of 
 
 2. Jeremy Waldron, The Conditions of Legitimacy: A Response to James Weinstein, 
32 CONST. COMMENT. 697, 703–04 (2017). 
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extremely aggressive language. The more wide-ranging Section 5,3 
it should be noted, was the basis for what Weinstein argues were 
the misguided criminal convictions of relatively temperate 
purveyors of noxious opinions. The clear implication of 
Waldron’s contrasting the two provisions is that speakers whose 
utterances are reachable only under Section 5 do not constitute a 
threat to the “precious public good” of “a visible assurance 
offered by society to all of its members that they will not be 
subject to abuse, defamation, humiliation, discrimination, and 
violence on grounds of race, ethnicity, religion, gender, and in 
some cases sexual orientation.”4 
But is that true? Mark Norwood, described by Weinstein as 
“a regional co-ordinator of the British National Party, a far-right 
political organization,” was convicted under Section 5 for 
displaying a poster of the World Trade Center in flames 
superimposed by a crescent-and-star surrounded by a prohibition 
sign and the statements “Islam out of Britain” and “Protect the 
British people.”5 Harry Hammond, an evangelical preacher, was 
convicted under the same provision for holding a placard in a 
public square saying “Stop Immorality,” “Stop Homosexuality,” 
“Stop Lesbianism,” “Jesus is Lord.”6 Weinstein calls this 
conviction “an egregious example” of abuse of the power to 
punish hate speech, and so it is. That said, wouldn’t British 
Muslims and homosexuals be justified in considering these public 
expressions at least as threatening to their civic standing by virtue 
of how their society “looks”—the visibility of hate—as public 
utterances that satisfy the intent or likely effects requirements of 
Section 18 (1) of the Public Order Act? 
Interestingly, Weinstein’s other examples of hate speech that 
ought never to have been the subject of punishment are different 
in a way that suggests Waldron would agree with that assessment. 
Shawn Holes was convicted and made to pay a large fine for 
 
 3. Section five of the Public Order Act of 1986 is not limited to speech designed or 
likely to stir up racial hatred. Instead, it prohibits both “threatening or abusive speech” 
and “disorderly behavior” that occurs “within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be 
caused harassment, alarm or distress thereby.” Public Order Act 1986, § 5 (Eng.). 
 4. Jeremy Waldron, Dignity and Defamation: The Visibility of Hate, 123 HARV. L. 
REV. 1597, 1599 (2010). 
 5. See Norwood v. Dir. of Pub. Pros’ns, [2003] EWHC 1564 (Admin), 
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2003/1564.html. 
 6. See Hammond v. Dep’t of Pub. Pros’ns, [2004] EWHC 69, ¶ 5 (Admin), 
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2004/69.html.  
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responding to an interlocutor while speaking in a Glasgow street 
by opining that “Homosexuals are deserving of the wrath of God, 
and so are all other sinners, and they are going to a place called 
hell.”7 Another street preacher, Michael Overd, was convicted in 
Somerset for invoking Leviticus 20:13 for the proposition that 
homosexuality is an “abomination.” Because that scriptural 
passage prescribes the death penalty as punishment, the judge 
found Mr. Overd’s exclamation to be in violation of Section 5 of 
the Public Order Act.8 Both examples involved oral rather than 
written denigration of minorities. On that account alone, even 
were these angry statements to fail a temperance test they would 
lack the ongoing visibility that Waldron considers the essence of 
the threat to the public good of civic assurance.9  
Although Waldron’s innovative public good argument adds 
something new and undeniably pertinent to the hate speech 
debate, deploying criminal sanctions against speakers as a way to 
assure vulnerable minorities of their civic standing presents novel 
challenges. At the end of the day, his is an argument about the 
importance of maintaining an environment of trust. Although he 
emphasizes outward manifestations of acceptance rather than 
inward beliefs, creating and sustaining the requisite civic aesthetic 
entails nurturing a working consensus about what to say in public 
that by definition depends on beliefs. That working consensus, if 
and when it exists, is unlikely to be fully formed. Not only are 
dissenters likely to resent the prescribed aesthetic, they are 
capable of subverting it even when their numbers are small. 
To put it bluntly, the needed public assurance requires the 
coercive enforcement, so far as public expression is concerned, of 
an orthodoxy of sorts regarding the determinants of civic 
standing. To his credit, Waldron faces up to this feature of his 
argument and asserts that there is such a thing as effective 
 
 7. Mark Hennessy, Street Preacher Fined for ‘Homosexuals Going to Hell’ Remark, 
IRISH TIMES (Mar. 31, 2010), http://www.irishtimes.com/news/street-preacher-fined-for-
homosexuals-going-to-hell-remark-1.646036. See also Preacher is Fined for Homophobia, 
THE SCOTSMAN (Mar. 27, 2010), http://www.scotsman.com/news/preacher-is-fined-for-
homophobia-1-1365514. 
 8. John Bingham, Preacher Accuses Judge of ‘Redacting’ the Bible, THE 
TELEGRAPH (Mar. 30, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/11505466/
Preacher-accuses-judge-of-redacting-the-Bible.html. 
 9. On the difference between written and spoken communication so far as 
Waldron’s public good of civic assurance is concerned see Waldron, supra note 4, at 1603–
04. 
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settlement of once divisive disputes over the significance for civic 
standing of race, ethnicity, religion, and gender, for example. On 
this topic, the need for foundational commitment trumps the 
open-ended, designedly dynamic adjustment and evolution of 
beliefs which is the hallmark of a marketplace of ideas. When 
settlement has been achieved, Waldron maintains, the regnant 
orthodoxy can then be enforced to the extent of punishing visible 
dissent that takes an aggressive form which undermines the 
assurance that enables civic security and participation. 
All of which brings us back to the problem about Waldron 
with which we began: he supplies no reason to tolerate temperate 
criticism of the reigning determinants of civic standing any more 
than intemperate criticism. Admittedly, he does intimate that laws 
criminalizing intemperate hate speech are more likely to be aimed 
at preventing bad effects and punishing bad intentions, and 
thereby less likely to be efforts to “prohibit the expression of 
certain views per se.”10 However, given the role that a specific 
kind of orthodoxy plays in his conception of civic assurance, it is 
not clear why Waldron ought to be particularly troubled by a law 
that seeks to “prohibit the expression of certain views per se.” 
Furthermore, temperate hate speech can be more subversive than 
its intemperate counterpart of the assurance of civic dignity that 
he prizes, so why aren’t laws punishing temperate hate speech also 
best characterized as concerned about effects rather than “views 
per se?” 
An understanding of the freedom of speech that emphasized 
such objectives as progress in understanding, democratic 
character building, adaptation to changing conditions, the 
exposure of corruption, or autonomous self-authorship might 
deny full (or any) protection to speech that is ill-intentioned, 
personally targeted, or abusively worded. But Waldron presents 
his argument about hate speech without allusion to why speech 
might be especially valuable as a general matter and how the 
answer to that question bears on which communicative activities 
fall with the ambit of the freedom of speech. So far as one can tell 
from his exploration of the subject to date, the distinction 
Waldron draws between the instances of hate speech that should 
be subject to criminal sanctions and those which should not 
derives from his judgment regarding which forms of this noxious 
 
 10. Waldron, supra note 2, at 702. 
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genre most subvert the assurance of civic dignity that all members 
of a well-ordered political community are entitled to. As 
explained above, I question that judgment regarding subversive 
potential because I believe that temperate criticism of the 
requisite foundational orthodoxy regarding civic standing is more 
subversive than intemperate criticism. 
Putting the point in terms of orthodoxy is not Waldron’s 
formulation, though he does speak of foundational commitments 
and does say that the obsession with viewpoint discrimination in 
United States free speech law is overdone and simplistic. 
Nevertheless, his concern for settlement, worry about the damage 
that unreconciled dissenters can do to civic flourishing, invention 
of a new public good, and characterization of civic dignity as “a 
necessary ingredient of public order” all suggest a common-good 
measure of well-being, one in which a sophisticated and bounded 
notion of orthodoxy may have a place. If I am reading him 
correctly on this point, temperate challenges to the civic standing 
of vulnerable minorities pose more of a problem for Waldron than 
he appreciates. 
II. 
James Weinstein differs from Waldron in at least two key 
respects that bear on how to treat dissenters who might threaten 
the assurance that is given to vulnerable minorities regarding their 
civic standing. First, Weinstein relies heavily on the principle 
against viewpoint discrimination in deciding which forms of hate 
speech are regulable, in sharp contrast to Waldron’s lack of 
enthusiasm for that principle as it has been elaborated in 
American law.11 This leads Weinstein to protect more hate speech 
than Waldron would, and for different reasons. Second, 
Weinstein derives from the premise of equal civic standing for all 
members of the community not only the need for assurance to 
vulnerable minorities that Waldron emphasizes, but also the need 
for strong legitimation of antidiscrimination laws, which he 
believes matter more to the civic standing of vulnerable minorities 
than the aesthetic environment of assurance that Waldron seeks. 
Weinstein maintains that the legitimation of 
antidiscrimination laws depends on extending to those who 
 
 11. Compare Weinstein, supra note 1, at 545–46, with Waldron, supra note 2, at 713, 
and Waldron, supra note 4, at 1638–39. 
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oppose such laws the freedom to criticize them, by employing 
either temperate or intemperate forms of hate speech if they 
choose, so long as their messages are not threateningly targeted 
against particular individuals. In a deft move, he bolsters the 
argument for that kind of robust free speech right by deriving it 
from the very premise of equal civic standing that underlies 
Waldron’s public good of assurance. In Weinstein’s view, that 
status generates in each member of the community a right “to 
participate as an equal in the public conversation about society’s 
collective decisions.”12 This right to participate does not depend 
on the speaker having views that stand a chance of being adopted: 
“an individual has an interest in expressing his or her views on a 
matter of public concern not just in the hope of influencing others 
‘but also just to confirm his or her standing as a responsible agent 
in, rather than a passive victim of, collective action.’”13 In arguing 
to protect temperate forms of hate speech, Weinstein establishes 
common ground with Waldron. However, the two differ regarding 
whether intemperate forms of hate speech deserve protection in 
certain instances14 —Weinstein says yes, Waldron says no—and 
whether the legitimation of antidiscrimination laws is an 
important reason to protect speech that disputes the civic standing 
of vulnerable minorities. Weinstein believes it is; Waldron does 
not. 
Weinstein has much to say about legitimation. I find helpful 
his account of how a person’s having been accorded the 
opportunity to “participate as an equal in the public conversation 
about society’s collective decisions” bears on his willingness as a 
descriptive matter to obey a law he opposed at the time of 
passage, his normative obligation to obey such a law, and the 
morality of society using coercive means to make him comply with 
that law. I agree with Weinstein that the last of these three 
dimensions of legitimation is the one that should most concern us 
for the purpose of evaluating hate speech regulation. I particularly 
like his argument that a strong enough moral justification for a 
particular law can outweigh a deficit in enabling equal 
participation so far as legitimating coercive enforcement is 
concerned. I also believe that Weinstein is correct to identify cases 
 
 12. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 528. 
 13. Id. at 550 (quoting Ronald Dworkin, Foreword, in EXTREME SPEECH AND 
DEMOCRACY, vii (Ivan Hare & James Weinstein eds., 2009)). 
 14. Compare id. at 548–50, 545–46 with Waldron, supra note 4, at 701–02. 
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denying claims of exemption from nondiscrimination laws on 
religious grounds as the domain where having been accorded 
sufficient speech rights at the time of a law’s passage carries the 
most significance so far as legitimation is concerned. 
Waldron questions the cogency of any kind of legitimation 
test that turns on whether a person subject to a nondiscrimination 
law has been given the opportunity to “participate as an equal” in 
the public discussion that led to passage of the law. In his view, 
political contestation that eventuates in legislation is “a swirling 
maelstrom of informal debate” about which “we have no way of 
keeping track of who says what to whom, who speaks, and who 
listens.” He says: 
[T]he best we can do is to say that everyone may participate as 
they like, though everyone agrees there are limits on how 
inflammatory their participation can be . . . . And if—for 
reasons of social peace—limits are placed on other effects that 
inflammatory speech may have, I don’t think the background 
public discourse is orderly enough to enable us to infer precise 
deontic conclusions about the individual rights that flow or do 
not flow from the political process.15 
Because Weinstein’s right to equal participation via speech 
lacks cogency in this way, Waldron concludes, narrowly drawn 
hate speech laws are not vulnerable on legitimation grounds for 
having denied speakers equal participation in the public 
conversation. At least that is so when those laws have “a positive 
relation to the integrity of the political process” and can be 
justified in terms of such matters as their capacity to prevent harm 
and their safeguards against arbitrary or corrupt enforcement. As 
he puts it: “if it is only unjustified restrictions on speech that affect 
legitimacy, then it looks as though we will have to settle the 
question of justification first, before we assess the impact on 
legitimacy.”16 
Does Weinstein have an answer to this powerful critique? If 
he does, I believe it has to lie in the way he develops and applies 
the principle against viewpoint regulation. Hate speech regulation 
is undeniably viewpoint discriminatory. Conventional First 
Amendment analysis is deeply skeptical of such regulation on that 
account. In turn, Jeremy Waldron is deeply skeptical of 
 
 15. Waldron, supra note 4, at 710–11. 
 16. Id. at 712. 
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conventional First Amendment doctrine on the same account. A 
first step in deciding who is right is to get clear exactly why, as a 
philosophical matter, viewpoint discrimination is so disfavored in 
some circles. Despite its dominant place in the law of the First 
Amendment, the possible reasons for the principle against 
viewpoint discrimination have not been developed as thoroughly 
as one might have supposed. One of the contributions of James 
Weinstein’s article on hate speech in this symposium is its fresh 
account of why viewpoint discrimination might be problematic. 
One of the earliest efforts to explain the principle against 
viewpoint discrimination was advanced by Judge Learned Hand 
in a 1920 letter to Professor Zechariah Chafee. Hand said: 
[A]ny State which professes to be controlled by public opinion, 
cannot take sides against any opinion except that which must 
express itself in the violation of law. On the contrary, it must 
regard all other expression of opinion as tolerable, if not good. 
As soon as it does not, it inevitably assumes that one opinion 
may control in spite of what might become an opposite opinion. 
It becomes a State based upon some opinion, as against any 
opinion which may get itself accepted . . . .17 
As I understand Waldron, he favors “a State based upon 
some opinion” regarding the traits that can never diminish a 
person’s civic standing, which is one reason he is skeptical about 
the principle against viewpoint discrimination. 
Geoffrey Stone has proposed a different justification. He 
suggests that viewpoint discriminatory laws are presumptively 
invalid because they “distort public debate” and “mutilate[] ‘the 
thinking process of the community.’”18 That rationale also does 
not impress Professor Waldron: 
Now, words like “distort” and “mutilate” beg the question, 
privileging what public debate would be like without 
intervention. It is worth asking why we should privilege the 
unregulated process or its output. . . . Stone is surely right to 
point out that restrictions on group defamation or hate speech 
are intended to modify the character of public debate. That is 
the whole point.19 
 
 17. Letter from Learned Hand to Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Jan. 8, 1920, reprinted in 
Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine: 
Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 723, 764–65 (1975). 
 18. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 55 (1987). 
 19. Waldron, supra note 4, at 1639. 
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James Weinstein offers a third and quite distinctive 
indictment of viewpoint discrimination. He considers the 
principle against viewpoint discrimination to derive from the 
premise that each member of the community has equal civic 
standing. In this account, viewpoint discrimination is not about 
the quality of public debate or the rightful sources of 
governmental authority, but rather the equal treatment of 
individuals. Respect for the civic dignity of each individual 
speaker may preclude the state from deploying its criminal law, 
and perhaps other sources of general leverage, to favor the ideas 
of some speakers over those of others. If that is right, Weinstein’s 
effort to support his case against hate speech regulation need not 
depend on his imaginative legitimation argument, which Waldron 
has questioned effectively. Rather, Weinstein has a more 
straightforward line of support, grounded in his novel rationale 
for the venerable principle against viewpoint regulation. 
One advantage of understanding the principle against 
viewpoint discrimination as deriving from the commitment to 
equal civic standing is that it raises the possibility of 
commensurability between the competing claims of right in the 
hate speech controversy. Both claims—respectively, to 
communicate one’s disturbing opinions and to be assured of one’s 
rightful place in the polity—sound in civic dignity. Both are claims 
of individual entitlement to a collective good by virtue of 
collective commitment. In these respects, the common currency 
of the competing claims is greater than is true for other possible 
commensurabilities that Weinstein discusses and finds wanting: 1) 
that between the good, which may follow from prohibiting hate 
speech, of assuring minorities of their civic standing, and the good, 
which may follow from not prohibiting hate speech, of 
contributing to the legitimation of antidiscrimination laws; and 2) 
that between the system-legitimating effects of tolerating group 
defamation and the system-delegitimating effects of deterring 
vulnerable minorities from speaking or otherwise participating in 
democratic governance. 
So what can be said about the competing, possibly 
commensurable, claims to civic dignity of a speaker who wishes to 
engage in hateful group defamation and a victim of such speech? 
Framed this way, with the focus on the civic dignity of the 
individual person rather than systemic benefits, such as political 
and legal legitimacy, quality of public discourse, general 
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knowledge, social stability, progress, or trust, the comparison 
need not reduce to rival claims of an empirical nature, mostly 
speculative and often broad-ranging. Instead, we might ask what 
are the essential components of the concept of civic dignity, and 
how are they vindicated or violated, conceptually rather than 
empirically, by regulating or failing to regulate hate speech. 
Notions about the proper ends and means of government 
intervention are bound to play a role in this kind of inquiry. If 
commensurability does indeed exist, a resolution of the hate 
speech controversy that maximizes the sum of the civic dignity of 
the parties is a worthy objective, as is a resolution that lexically 
privileges any components of civic dignity that might be regarded 
as at the core of the concept. 
In the space appropriate for a critical response in a 
symposium, I cannot do justice to either the importance or the 
complexity of the task of comparison I have just outlined. I can, 
however, offer a few discrete observations about some of the 
variables. 
First, I don’t think that the obvious moral disparity between 
the rival claimants to civic dignity in the hate speech controversy 
ought to influence the comparison. The very notion of civic 
dignity entails that morally unworthy members of the community 
are entitled to civic status equal to that accorded the most 
admirable members. That, in part, is what the rule of law is all 
about. 
Second, the most important value at stake in the comparison, 
as I see it, is freedom of thought. Professor Waldron recognizes 
this when he insists that a person’s ideas cannot be regulated on 
the basis that they offend others,20 and also when he makes clear 
that his proposal to punish hate speech is not designed to change 
the opinions or attitudes of the speakers, but rather to make their 
vile opinions less visible, so as to protect the civic self-regard of 
their targeted victims.21 Assurance, the good that is claimed by 
those who would regulate hate speech under Waldron’s theory, is 
important largely because it enables the free thought of the 
victims—thought undistorted by concerns about personal safety 
or insecurity about belonging—and through that their capacity to 
act civically. Even though he does not mention the connection, his 
 
 20. See Waldron, supra note 4, at 1612–14. 
 21. Id. at 1633. 
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prioritization of freedom of thought supports Waldron’s position 
that only group defamation published with the intention to cause 
hate and using words designed to threaten or abuse should be 
subject to criminal sanctions. Temperate expressions of noxious 
views about the lack of civic standing of minorities may well cause 
as much or more harm to their civic dignity as does speech that 
combines such evil ideas with aggressive intentions or words, but 
objection to the thought itself is more likely to be driving a 
regulation of hate speech when these additional features are not 
a precondition for punishment. 
Third, the fact that assurance of civic standing is a more 
fragile and subtle state of affairs than is freedom from formal 
government sanctions is relevant in comparing the rival claims to 
civic dignity of the speaker and victim. This disparity is most 
regrettable but undeniably real. Law can only do what it can do. 
As a practical matter, it is possible to respect the civic dignity of 
speakers engaging in hate speech when all that is required is 
granting them immunity from coercive government sanctions for 
their speech. (Such speakers, of course, enjoy no immunity from 
social punishment, should they reveal their nasty opinions beyond 
their own narrowest circles. Given that, their formal negative 
liberty may not leave them truly free in a broader sense to think 
what they will.) Less possible is according the victims of hate 
speech respect for their civic dignity when what is required is 
meaningful assurance of their civic standing. We might, of course, 
define the civic dignity at issue to relate only to be how the hate 
speech victims are treated by government rather than by the 
society as a whole. For assurance to do the work Waldron 
envisions, however, I would think there would have to be 
substantial buy-in from the public at large, albeit buy-in generated 
by government policy. As a result, vindicating the civic dignity of 
minorities assaulted by hate speech is more difficult, practically 
speaking, than vindicating the civic dignity of speakers who 
engage in group defamation. I would not give this disparity in 
what is practically possible a great deal of weight in the 
comparison, but I do think it should count somewhat in favor of 
the claims of the speakers. 
Fourth, the claim to civic dignity derives, it would seem, from 
the type of regime that a person lives under. It is not a natural 
right, if such a thing exists. Perhaps civic dignity is regime-
dependent not only in origin but also in specific contours. A 
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liberal monarchy or oligarchy might be expected to have a 
different conception of civic dignity than a republic. The United 
States might have a different conception than Great Britain or 
France, on account of its cultural self-image, and perhaps even 
worldwide iconic status, as a participatory democracy. All this 
could bear on the hate speech issue in that the claim to assurance 
of civic standing might be understood as particularly important in 
a regime that entrusts its ordinary citizens with a great deal of 
political responsibility, not to mention a regime that has a history 
of systematic exclusion from political responsibility of 
populations now expected to participate in governance. On the 
other hand, specific to the form that republican government has 
taken in this country, at least for a century, is an almost 
inexplicable prioritization of the freedom of speech. I suppose 
that could cut two ways: perhaps our understanding of civic 
dignity needs to guard against overvaluing that particular 
freedom. But if the governing conception of civic dignity should 
be regime-specific in part so as to express some sort of collective 
identity, the claim to speak one’s mind however benighted—a 
stronger claim than to be free to embrace nefarious opinions 
under wraps—has to be given great weight in any comparison of 
rival claims in the United States. 
 
 
